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CASES AND COMMENTS
WHO ARE THE CITIZENS OF SOUTH AFRICA
AND TRANSKEI?
A little-known fact of South African law is that all South African whites,
coloureds and Indians have ceased to be South African citizens and are
now citizens of Transkei. As a result, the only people who are now South
African citizens are those South African blacks who have not become
citizens of Transkei.
These revelations may be surprising, yet they are dictated by the plain
language of the Status of Transkei Act 100 of 1976. This Act was the first to
grant independence to one of the South African homelands. Among its
provisions was a detailed statement, contained in Schedule B, of the bases
on which individuals would be reviewed henceforth as Transkeian citizens
and deprived of their South African citizenship by virtue of the Act.
For our purposes, the most relevant provisions specifying Transkeian
citizenship are those contained in paras (f) and (g) of Schedule B. (Section
6(1) of the Act directs that '[e]very person falling in any of the categories of
persons defined in Schedule B shall be a citizen of the Transkei and shall
cease to be a South African citizen'.') Paragraph (f) addresses the
citizenship of 'every South African citizen who is not a citizen of a territory
within the Republic of South Africa, [and] is not a citizen of Transkei' on
one of the grounds enumerated earlier in the Schedule. Plainly this group
includes all or almost all South African whites, coloureds and Indians -
assuming that these people did not in fact have Transkeian citizenship by
virtue of one of the earlier subsections of the Schedule (providing for
citizenship on a variety of other grounds). After all, South African whites,
coloureds and Indians were highly unlikely to be citizens of one of the
territories, that is to say the black territories, within the Republic of South
Africa, or of Transkei itself.
Moreover, and quite obviously, the whites, coloureds and Indians fall in
the category of 'South African citizens'. We cannot take Parliament to
I Other sections of the Act address the continued application of preexisting rules of law (s2), treaties,
conventions and agreements binding on the Republic and capable of being applied toTranskei (s4),
and treaties, conventions and agreements between the Republic and Transkei (sS). Conceivably
there are provisions in such sources of law that might delineate Transkeian and South African
citizenship in a way different from that outlined in this article. If any such conflicts exist, however,
surely the express and clear language of s6 and Schedule B should be taken to be controlling.
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have meant to refer only to black citizens of South Africa, for the Act
nowhere states that it deals only with blacks. By contrast, in the National
States Citizenship Act 26 of 1970, Parliament specified that persons whose
citizenship it was allocating to the various territorial authority areas were
'every black person' not otherwise covered (ss 2(2) and 3). The omission of
any mention of race in the Status of Transkei Act no doubt reflects
Parliament's justifiable concern that legislation establishing a new nation
on racial lines would be viewed with disfavour by the international
community. Since the decision to excise any reference to race can hardly
have been inadvertent, it obviously should be given effect by the courts.
The people covered by para (f) become citizens of Transkei and lose
their South African citizenship if they '[speak] a language used by the
Xhosa or Sotho-speaking section of the population of the Transkei,
including any dialect of any such languages'. Now we may assume that
relatively few whites, coloureds, or Indians otherwise falling within para (f)
speak Xhosa or Sotho - though obviously any who do have been
rendered Transkeian as a result. But the statute does not refer only to
speakers of Xhosa or Sotho. Had Parliament wished to affect only those
people who spoke Xhosa or Sotho, it could easily have said exactly that.
Instead, this provision refers to all those South African citizens who are
neither citizens of a territory nor already citizens of Transkei, and who
speak any language 'used' by Xhosa or Sotho-speaking persons in
Transkei. Those who speak Xhosa or Sotho undoubtedly 'use' a range of
other languages as well.
Among these other languages will be a variety of other black (bantu)
languages. But it is clear that Parliament meant to include not only black
languages but also languages of European origin. Again, Parliament could
easily have specified that only black languages fell within the ambit of this
statute. Yet it did not. Manifestly this omission is significant, for in the
National States Citizenship Act 26 of 1970, Parliament demonstrated that
it knew very well how to specify black languages if it wished to. Section 3(c)
of the National States Citizenship Act in fact conferred territorial
authority area citizenship on black persons who '[speak] any black
language used by the black population' in the area in question. No doubt
Parliament chose to avoid so racialist a definition of the language basis for
citizenship in the Status Act out of the same concerns for international
impact cited earlier. Both statutory language and context thus confirm
that the languages in question in this paragraph of Schedule B must
include all languages, whatever their origin, 'used by the Xhosa or Sotho-
speaking section of the population of the Transkei'.
It seems safe to say that both English and Afrikaans are widely used by
Xhosa and Sotho-speaking black citizens of Transkei. As a result, we need
not investigate the interesting question of whether there are any whites,
coloureds, or Indians who form part of the 'Xhosa or Sotho-speaking
section of the population of the Transkei'. Obviously the discovery of any
such people who were also speakers of English or Afrikaans would provide
an independent - but quite redundant - basis for concluding that this
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Act meant to confer Transkeian citizenship on speakers of English and
Afrikaans. Since virtually the entire white, coloured, and Indian
population of South Africa at the time that the Status of Transkei Act
came into effect also spoke English or Afrikaans, it follows that all of these
people lost their South African citizenship on the independence of
Transkei and became Transkeians.
Actually, many of these people probably gained Transkeian citizenship,
and lost their South African nationality, on other grounds as well.
Paragraph (g) of Schedule B, like para (f), applies to 'every South African
citizen who is not a citizen of a territory within the Republic of South
Africa and is not a citizen of Transkei' on grounds enumerated earlier in
the Schedule - and so includes more or less all South African whites,
coloureds, and Indians, if these people had somehow not become
Transkeians under para (f). If they weren't Transkeianized under para (f),
in any case, they probably were under para (g).
This paragraph provides, first, that any person within its general ambit
becomes a Transkeian if he or she 'is related to any member of the
population contemplated in para (f)'. It seems quite inconceivable that any
white, coloured, or Indian person in South Africa is not related to one of
the white, coloured, or Indian persons whom para (f) rendered
Transkeian. (As a result, we need not scrutinize such intriguing questions
as the extent to which whites, say, are related to coloureds who are related
to blacks.)
If so unrelated a person could be found, he might still become a
Transkeian if he 'has identified himself with any part of such population or
is culturally or otherwise associated with any member or part of such
population'. These provisions are broad enough, surely, to encompass
anyone who empathizes with any of the whites, coloureds, and Indians
who are deprived of South African nationality; who employs and thus
associates with any such person; or who associates with such persons by
serving as their attorney or advocate. No doubt ingenious minds will
suggest other implications of this broad language as well.
Need I add that the fact that most of the whites, coloureds, and Indians
on whom Transkeian citizenship was conferred did not reside in the
Transkei was no barrier at all to their receiving this benefit? That point,
after all, is apparent from the Act's treatment of black Transkeians.
Indeed, s 6(3) of the Act is specifically addressed to the situation of those
citizens of Transkei who are 'resident in the Republic at the
commencement of this Act'.
I trust I have now satisfactorily demonstrated that all South African
whites, coloureds, and Indians ceased some years ago to be South Africans
and became Transkeians. It would seem that these non-black Transkeians
should be taking steps to secure representation of their interests in
Transkeian political processes. This would appear to be their only course
for obtaining self-government. The alternative of trying to amend the
Status of Transkei Act to recapture the South African citizenship which
they lost by virtue of that Act is, of course, not open to these denationalized
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persons for the simple reason that they are no longer South African
citizens and accordingly cannot amend any South African legislation
anymore.
Conversely, it would appear that the South African blacks who did not
become Transkeians are the only people who remain South African
citizens. Although some of these people were later seemingly deprived of
their South African citizenship when Venda, Bophuthatswana and Ciskei
were granted independence, the legislators who purported to vote for the
independence of these three countries were themselves Transkeians and
not South Africans, and so obviously had no authority to deprive anyone
of South African citizenship.
No doubt the now all-black citizenry of South Africa will also wish to
take appropriate action to implement their right of self-government. One
initial step on these lines might be to apprise international bodies of the
true composition of the South African and Transkeian polities.
STEPHEN J ELLMANN
Associate Professor of Law.
Columbia UniversitY in the City of New York
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AS A MEANS OF
HONOURING HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITMENTS:
Segale v Government of Bophuthatswana
1987 (3) SA 237 (B)
For some time now, the feasibility of a bill of rights for South Africa has
been debated. Part of the debate has focused on the suitability of the
various mechanisms through which such an instrument might be enforced.
Precious little detailed attention has been directed to how the judiciary is
likely to or ought to construe a document entrenching fundamental rights.
This may in part be a result of the fact that South Africa has had little
exposure to the interpretation of human rights documents.
It is in this context that the decision of the Supreme Court of Bophutha-
tswana in Segale v Government of Bophuthatswana 1987 (3) SA 237 (B) is
especially welcome, for it signals a positive prognosis for a bill of rights and
for human rights in South Africa. This assumes, of course, that Segale
constitutes the beginning of a new trend in the interpretation of the
Bophuthatswana Constitution.
Segale's case concerned the interpretation of ss 15 and 16 of the
Bophuthatswana Constitution. These provisions enshrine the freedom of
expression, and the freedoms of peaceful assembly and of association,
respectively. Both provide for derogation from the freedoms in the interest
of national security, the public order and other similar considerations.
The applicant, Segale, was the chairman of the opposition political
party, the National Seoposengwe Party (NSP), which applied for
permission to hold a political meeting, as was required in terms of
